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When we think of human rights and religion, we generally think of complimentary—
or even subsumed—ideas. Human rights include all of those human capacities and 
freedoms that are essential to human existence. This includes freedom of religion. 
And although there are disputes in the twenty-first century world legal order about 
some human-rights claims, freedom of religion is not one of them. It is universally 
recognized, at least as an abstract idea, as a fundamental human right.
However, this happy identity of religion and human rights is a superficial 
one. This is because freedom of religion, asserted as a human right by one person, 
might involve—as its consequence or even its object—the denial of the human 
rights of others. When this occurs, the simple identity of religion and human rights 
breaks down; instead the two become severe antagonists.
In this essay, I will explore the issues involved in the antagonism between 
religion and human rights. In particular, I will examine these issues in the context 
of a current and heated controversy: whether freedom of religion, as a human 
right, entitles an individual or group to discriminate against gay, lesbian, or 
transgender individuals or couples for religious reasons. For example, a municipal 
clerk might refuse to issue a same-sex marriage license or to register a same-
sex civil partnership;1 an employee of a government contractor (hired to provide 
counseling services to government employees) might refuse to provide same-
sex relationship counseling;2 or a physician might refuse to provide infertility 
treatment to a lesbian woman, all on asserted religious grounds.3
1 See, e.g., In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the Marriage Act, 
1995, 2011 SKCA 3 (Canada).
2 See, e.g., Walden v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, No. 1:08-cv-02278-JEC 
(N.D. Ga. 2010).
3 See, e.g., North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. Benitez, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
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The case for religious exceptionalism in such settings was recently articulated 
by litigants in a prominent Canadian case. At issue, opponents declared, was 
whether courts could “force [Christian] marriage commissioners [to] perform gay 
‘marriages.’”4 Legal counsel for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, which 
prosecuted the case, observed that “‘[o]ur high court has consistently noted that 
the right to freedom of religion is broad and [that] it includes the right to belief 
and the right to act on those beliefs. . . . It is the role of governments in Canada 
to ensure [that] all enjoy these cherished freedoms.’”5 Their religious beliefs, 
opponents argued, were integral parts of their lives, and must be accommodated by 
the government. Any attempt by the government to force marriage commissioners 
to violate their personal religious beliefs and “privatize” their religious faith must 
be opposed.6
The clash between the religious rights of some and the civil rights of others 
is a complex and deep matter. In this essay, I cannot hope to address all aspects 
of this issue. However, I will attempt to establish that such cases are not ones 
of simple religious accommodation, as religious advocates argue. Furthermore, I 
will argue that whatever the merits of the general idea of religious exceptionalism, 
it cannot prevail in conflicts with identity-based human rights. 
2. Religious Freedom, Religious Exceptionalism: 
Some Foundational Issues
Because of its long history of asserted protection for both religious rights and 
other human rights, the jurisprudence of the United States is a rich trove when it 
comes to issues of religious/human-rights conflicts.
Human rights—or “civil rights,” as legally protected human rights in 
American jurisprudence are called—are a subset of the broader category of 
established secular norms and secular law. As a general proposition, the approach 
of American courts and legislatures toward religion/state relations has been one of 
presumed acceptance of religious exceptionalism in cases of conflict with secular 
law. It is a legal truism that religious belief cannot be controlled by the state, 
and is afforded absolute protection by law.7 In addition, the idea that religious 
4 See Rebecca Millette, “Sask. Premier Defends Decision to Force Marriage Commissioners 
[to] Perform Gay ‘Marriages,’” LifeSiteNews.com, January 24, 2011, www.lifesitenews.
com/news/sask-premier-defends-decision-to-force-marriage-commissioners-perform-gay/ 
(accessed July 18, 2012).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603–605 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 304–305 (1940).
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freedom involves religious practice, and thus—in the case of conflict—requires 
the compromise of secular norms, is a familiar one in American jurisprudence. 
Whether imposed by statutory language or court decision, the idea that freedom 
of religion requires “special” or “exceptional” treatment to ensure its protection 
is taken for granted in large swaths of American law. For many years, the United 
States Supreme Court required special, exceptional protection for religious 
practice when it conflicted with secular law.8 Today, religious exceptionalism as a 
presumptive value continues to exist in federal, state, and local laws.9  
Religious exceptionalism, as an idea, is simple; its implementation, however, 
is not.  Even where it an accepted principle, serious issues lurk just below the 
surface. These include the definition of “religion”; the meaning of “exercise”; and 
the limits of their protection. 
2.1 What is “Religion”?
One of the most difficult issues in a regime of religious exceptionalism is deciding 
what “religion” is for this purpose. In a society in which asserted religious 
identities are limited in kind and relatively noncontroversial, the formulation of an 
understanding of “religion” might not generate much controversy. However, in a 
nation of celebrated religious pluralism, such as the United States, deciding what 
beliefs are religious (and thus afforded exceptional treatment) can be a difficult, 
foundational conundrum.
In its constitutional jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has 
long contended with this issue. In early opinions, the Court defined religion in 
traditional, theistic terms. For instance, the essence of religion was stated to be 
“a belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any 
8 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review Board, 
450 U.S. 707, 717–719 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–221 (1972). In 
1990, the Court attempted to eliminate the idea that religious believers are presumptively 
exempt, as a federal constitutional matter, from otherwise neutral and generally applicable 
secular laws. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). This led to a 
struggle with Congress and the subsequent enactment of two federal laws that attempted 
to reassert religious exceptionalism. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 
U.S.C. §2000bb et. seq.; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 
U.S.C. §2000cc et. seq.. The Supreme Court struck down the first, as beyond Congressional 
power. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The second has so far survived. 
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
9 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (employment discrimination); 42 U.S.C. §2000 cc et. 
seq. (institutionalized persons and land use); 50 U.S.C. App. §451 et. seq. (compulsory 
military service).
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human relation,”10 or “one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and . . . the 
obligations they impose.”11 
The presence of well-known but non-theistic religions presented a persistent 
challenge to theistic understandings. In 1961, the Court succumbed to this reality 
and adopted a broader approach. In a now-famous footnote, the Court included 
non-theistic religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular 
Humanism within its “religious” definition.12 The Court subsequently clarified 
that non-theistic beliefs that meet the “test of religion” are those that are “sincere 
and meaningful” and occupy a place in the life of those who hold it parallel to that 
filled by the orthodox belief in God.13 In an attempt to further limit religious claims, 
the Court has consistently insisted that religious belief is more than philosophic 
conviction.14 However, it has not, to date, explained just how religious beliefs differ 
from philosophical ones. Scholarly attempts to fill this void include suggestions 
that religion should be understood as an individual’s “ultimate concern,”15 or that 
it is “the affirmation of some truth, reality, or value” that addresses fundamental 
issues of human existence.16 However, why philosophical convictions do not also 
meet these criteria remains unexplained.
One might argue that defining religion is a more theoretical than practical 
problem, since we generally know what religion is. For instance, it is universally 
acknowledged in liberal democratic countries that the so-called “Abrahamic 
faiths” of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are religions, and their prevalence 
means that the vast majority of religious disputes involve these beliefs. 
Indeed, a justice of the United States Supreme Court recently argued that the 
popular acceptance of particular faiths can in practice be dispositive of their 
recognition by government. The establishment of monotheism by government 
is permissible, he wrote, because monotheism—as exhibited by Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam—accounts for 97.7% of all religious believers in the United 
States.17 Thus, for practical reasons if for no other, the Establishment Clause of 
the Constitution, in his view, “permits . . . disregard of polytheists and believers 
10 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
11 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
12 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
13 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
14 See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 215–216.
15 See “Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion,” Harvard Law Review 91 (1978): 
1056, 1071.
16 John H. Mansfield, “Conscientious Objection—1964 Term,” in Religion and the Public 
Order, ed. David A. Gianella (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 3, 10.
17 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in unconcerned deities” by government in its acknowledgment of religion in 
American life.18 
Although a rough-cut approach such as this might (arguably) be sufficient 
in some contexts, it cannot suffice when the question is claimed religious 
exceptionalism from secular norms. When religious exceptionalism is asserted, 
the issue at hand is the protection of the claimant’s religious (human) rights. The 
most powerful reason for recognizing human-rights claims in law is to protect 
them from denial by the majority. When that issue is raised, there must be a more 
principled reason for granting or denying an asserted faith excepted status than 
that it does, or does not, enjoy majoritarian support. 
Problems involved in determining religious legitimacy are compounded 
when it is remembered that the question involves not only the recognition of a 
“religious” group, but also the recognition of particular beliefs of individuals 
within that group. The inherently subjective nature of religion has led American 
courts to refuse to examine the existence, legitimacy, or sincerity of declared 
religious belief. Famously, the United States Supreme Court pronounced in 
United States v. Ballard19 that “[m]en may believe what they cannot prove. . . . 
Religious expressions which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible 
to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean 
that they can be made suspect before the law.”20
Occasionally, courts have articulated outer boundaries to this tolerance, 
although these boundaries appear to be little more than the exercise of subjective 
judgment. For instance, a lower federal court opined that constitutional protection 
does not extend to “so-called religions that tend to mock established institutions 
and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid 
of religious sincerity.”21 However, how one separates those that are “obviously 
shams and absurdities” from those that are not remains unexplained. In a very 
recent case, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,22 the Supreme Court was 
presented with professed followers of the religion of Summum, which was stated 
to have been founded in 1975 and presently headquartered in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Summum is said to involve belief in the “Seven Aphorisms,” which are 
similar in some ways to the Ten Commandments of Judaism and Christianity. It 
is also claimed to be inspired by a visit of other-worldly beings, and to involve—
18 See ibid. For a critique of this argument, see Laura S. Underkuffler, “Through a Glass 
Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence,” First Amendment Law Review 5 (2006): 59.
19 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
20 Ibid., 86–87 (citations omitted).
21 Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
22 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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as core practices—the fermentation of a sacramental nectar, the mummification 
of remains, and the preparation of a sexual ointment called Mehr.23 Owing 
undoubtedly to the inherent difficulty in evaluating such religious claims, the 
United States Supreme Court assumed (without discussion) that this was a 
religious organization and that the beliefs asserted by its followers were bona 
fide.24 Another recent case, Cutter v. Wilkinson,25 involved assertions of religious 
exceptionalism by state prisoners who claimed to be believers in the Church of 
Jesus Christ Christian, a white supremacist organization; followers of Asatru, 
a polytheistic religion with claimed Northern European origins; a Satanist; 
and a witch.26 To avoid the religious-assessment problem, the state defendants 
stipulated that the prisoners were members of bona fide religions and that they 
were sincere in their beliefs—conclusions that the Supreme Court simply adopted 
without comment.27   
The refusal of courts to examine the legitimacy or sincerity of professed 
religious beliefs, of course, creates problems of its own. When the question is the 
granting of religious exceptionalist claims, the problems involved in leaving the 
existence, definition, and sincerity of religious beliefs to the individual adherent 
are obvious. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, government cannot 
afford to create a situation in which “each conscience is a law unto itself.”28 Yet, 
to attempt to foreclose claims as a definitional matter runs afoul of prohibitions 
against state-imposed orthodoxy29 and would involve the courts in the difficult 
and unseemly task of external validation. As a result, courts remain in a precarious 
position, committed (in principle) to honor all religious claims, while wary (in 
practice) of what this might mean. 
2.2 What is Protected “Exercise”?
Assuming that cognizable “religious” status is established, a regime of religious 
exceptionalism requires a final, important step. Even if the religious nature of the 
23 See www.summum.us/about/welcome.shtml (accessed July 18, 2012).
24 See Summum, 555 U.S. (above n. 22), 460.
25 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. (above n. 8), 709.
26 Ibid., 712.
27 Ibid., 713.
28 Smith, 494 U.S. (above n. 8), 890.
29 At a minimum, the enforcement of government decrees regarding these questions risks 
“establishing a notion respecting religion” in violation of the American Constitution’s 
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
215 (1963) (the United States Constitution requires “absolute equality before the law, of 
all religious opinions and sects”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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belief is established, one must determine whether the particular “exercise” of that 
belief is one that can be protected by law.
When it comes to legal protection for religious claims, the separate categories 
of religious belief, identity, and action must be remembered. If the case simply 
involves religious belief, or the assertion of religious identity (without more), it 
is a relatively easy one. Because contemporary liberal democracies rarely attempt 
to determine the beliefs in citizens’ minds, or criminalize identity alone, cases 
involving religious beliefs or the assertion of religious identity will rarely present 
conflicts with secular law. One can imagine unusual cases, such as where religious 
identity or belief is intertwined with what the state believes to be a prohibited 
terrorist affiliation or organization. However, cases in which simple religious 
identity or belief qua belief conflicts with state criminal or civil law will be rare. 
Almost always, it will be action—such as advocacy, or more—that will trigger the 
religious/secular conflict.  
It is, thus, in the realm of religiously based action that most difficulties 
emerge. A regime of religious exceptionalism must have some way to distinguish 
protected religious claims to act from those who are not protected, lest religious 
actors become anarchic powers beyond the reach of the law. Whatever the precise 
formulation, the goals of this winnowing process are generally these: to identify 
religious beliefs that are important; that are seriously impaired by secular law; and 
that will not be too damaging to secular interests, should the claim to religious 
privilege be granted.
American law is rife with tests of this sort. Reflecting a typical approach, 
American constitutional law long held that religiously based action is protected if 
it is required by a central religious belief; is substantially burdened by government 
action; and is not outweighed by any compelling government interest.30
Implementing these tests has been fraught with practical difficulties, some 
integrally related to the problems previously discussed. For example, the 
requirement that the religious action involve a “central” religious belief, and that 
the belief be “burdened” by government, yields little substance in practice. Since 
30 See Hernandez, 490 U.S. (above n. 8), 699; Thomas, 450 U.S. (above n. 8), 717–719; 
Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 220–221. This approach was abandoned by the United 
States Supreme Court—as a doctrinal matter—in 1990. See Smith, 494 U.S. (above n. 
8), 878–890. In Smith, a religious drug use case, the Court held that if prohibiting or 
burdening the exercise of religion is not the object of the law, and merely “the incidental 
effect of a generally applicable . . .  provision,” the First Amendment is not offended. 
See ibid., 878. This change had the effect—in form, at least—of abolishing religious 
exceptionalism in federal constitutional cases. It did not mean, of course, that federal 
statutes, state constitutions, and state statutes could not continue to use this approach, as 
indeed they have.
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(again) the nature and requirements of religious belief must be left to the declarant, 
there are few claims (if any) that can be eliminated by these tests. As a result, the 
“centrality” and “burden” tests have been little discussed by American courts, and 
only rarely have they played any role in the court’s disposition of the claim.31 
With the “centrality” and “burden” tests relatively meaningless, it is the 
final, “compelling interest” test that limits religious exceptionalism in American 
courts. This test represents, of course, the crux of the matter. Religious claims, 
however important to the adherent and however impaired by government action, 
must yield—at some point—to secular state concerns. Religious exceptionalism, 
however much we might value it in principle, cannot be interpreted to allow 
religious adherents to engage in rape, pillage, mayhem, and murder. Under 
any interpretation, religious exceptionalism must yield—at some point—to the 
essential values protected by government.
The question is what that point is. In American law, divining any overarching 
principles from judicial decisions in this area is difficult. For instance, past Supreme 
Court decisions have held particular government interests to be compelling, 
or not, with little in the way of articulated reasons. Compelling state interests 
were found in the forced participation of citizens in the social security system, 
in compulsory military service, and in the prohibition of polygamy.32 Less-than-
compelling government interests were found in universal childhood education, 
work requirements for participation in state unemployment compensation plans, 
and licensing and taxing systems that govern in-person solicitation activities.33 
31 Such rare cases include Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 304–305 (1985) (denying constitutional free-exercise claim on the ground that the 
government action did not actually burden the claimant’s religious beliefs); Hernandez, 
490 U.S. (above n.8), 699 (although “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretation of those creeds, ... [w]e do, however, have doubts [as to] whether the alleged 
burden [in this case] . . . is a substantial one”).
32 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native Americans’ claims for exception 
from assignment of Social Security numbers); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) 
(rejecting Amish claim for exemption from participation in the Social Security system); 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (rejecting claim for exemption by a selective 
(compulsory military) service inductee who opposed war on religious grounds); Late 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 
1 (1890) (denying Mormons’ asserted right to practice polygamy); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (same).
33 See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 205 (accepting claim of religious adherent to exemption 
from compulsory education of children after the eighth grade); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (invalidating state unemployment rules that 
conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under 
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Although one can imagine reasons that support each of these determinations, 
there are also good reasons that do not. For instance, the state would seem to 
suffer relatively little harm if it allowed religious groups to provide their own 
old-age assistance to their members,34 whereas the state’s interest in childhood 
education would seem to be profound.35
 The problem in the articulation of standards is that the government 
interests that oppose religious claims are as diverse as the reasons for the 
existence of government itself. At one extreme are interests that are fundamental 
to an organized society—interests which, if abandoned, would endanger the 
state’s existence. At the other extreme are interests that promote general social 
(but ultimately nonessential) “well being,”36 such as those that are involved in the 
positive but non-essential running of the modern bureaucratic state. In a regime 
of religious exceptionalism, claimed religious privilege must certainly yield to 
the former, while it would almost as certainly—if it has any meaning—trump the 
latter. The problem is where, along this spectrum, particular religious claims lie. 
 * * * * *
To summarize the situation thus far, it is clear that there are difficult issues that are 
an inherent part of the implementation of any regime of religious exceptionalism 
through law.  When the question is the conferral of extra-legal privilege, 
establishing the boundaries of that privilege is critical. Yet, the inherently 
subjective nature of religious identity, religious sincerity, and required religious 
exercise seem antithetical—by their very nature—to state definition and control. 
Beyond that issue, there is the difficult task of weighing religious claims against 
competing state interests.  
One could respond to these difficulties by concluding that regimes of religious 
exceptionalism are inherently unworkable and should, therefore, be abandoned by 
post-modern legislatures and courts.37 The fact remains, however, that protection 
conditions forbidden by his or her religion); Thomas, 450 U.S. (above n. 8), 707 (same); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down licensing and taxing 
systems that restricted religious speech and solicitations); Cantwell, 310 U.S. (above n. 
7), 296 (same).
34 See Lee, 455 U.S. (above n. 32), 252.
35 See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 205.
36 See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, “The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A 
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory,” William and Mary Law Review 38 
(1995): 837, 924.
37 For classic statements of this view in the American constitutional context, see Christopher 
L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, “The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional 
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of religious belief and practice from secular governments continues to occupy 
a special place in most liberal democratic thought.38 If the idea of religious 
exceptionalism in law is to exist, under some circumstances, what should those 
circumstances be?
Against the background previously discussed, and for the remainder of this 
essay, I will consider this question in a specific context: the clash between religious 
exceptionalism and gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals’ civil rights. 
3. The Clash with Civil Rights
The protection of human rights, as legal “civil rights,” is a ubiquitous feature 
of liberal democratic constitutional government. In the United States, general 
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, 
and national origin have been entrenched for decades in national and state laws. 
Although still a patchwork affair, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
has been increasingly added to the prohibited list in various states. As of this 
writing, almost half of the states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting 
sexual-orientation discrimination in public and private-sector employment.39 
Statutes and ordinances also prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination in public 
accommodations, housing, and credit.40 Perhaps most dramatically, nine states 
and the District of Columbia currently authorize same-sex marriage as a legal 
right.41  
Recognition of guarantees of civil rights and the principle of religious 
exceptionalism by the same legal order creates an inherently volatile mix. It is 
virtually inevitable that the religious beliefs and practices of some will conflict with 
Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct,” University of Chicago Law Review 61 (1994): 
1245; and William P. Marshall, “In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,” 
University of Chicago Law Review 58 (1991): 308.
38 Elsewhere I have argued that under American law, the protection of religious conscience 
has—and should have—real meaning, and that this includes some protection from the 
mandate of secular law. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, “Public Funding for Religious 
Schools: Difficulties and Dangers in a Pluralistic Society,” Oxford Review of Education 
27 (2001): 577, 584–588; Underkuffler, “Yoder and the Question of Equality,” Capital 
University Law Review 25 (1996): 789; Underkuffler, “Individual Conscience and the 
Law,” DePaul Law Review 42 (1002): 93.
39 See “Sexual Orientation Discrimination: Your Rights,” www.nolo.com/legal–encyclopedia/
sexual-orientation-discrimination-rights-29541.html (accessed July 18, 2012).
40 “Sexual Discrimination and Orientation,” US Legal Law Digest, http://lawdigest.uslegal.
com/civil-rights/sexual-discrimination-and-orientation/7177 (accessed July 18, 2012).
41 Those states are Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, Vermont, and Washington.
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the civil rights of others at a certain point, and that religious adherents will claim 
exemption from those civil-rights guarantees. Although not the typical religious-
exemption case, there have been many American cases in past decades that have 
pitted religious exceptionalism claims against state efforts to enforce civil rights. 
For instance, claims to a right to engage in race, gender, and religious discrimination 
on religious grounds have been asserted repeatedly in American courts.42
With the advent of legal recognition of civil rights for gay, lesbian, and 
transgender individuals, claims of religious exceptionalism have intensified. The 
popular press is rife with accounts of religious individuals or organizations that 
vow to hold fast to their beliefs and deny services, products, or membership to 
gay, lesbian, or transgender individuals on religious grounds. Religious objections 
have been emphasized by opponents in the rhetorical war over proposed same-sex 
marriage legitimization.  
In an attempt to defuse the issue, proponents of same-sex marriage have often 
employed conciliatory language, making clear that (under existing and proposed 
law) religious institutions and religious clergy would be exempt from performing 
same-sex marriages.43 However, the exemption of clergy and religious 
institutions has not silenced critics. Religious freedom, they claim, extends not 
only to religious institutions and their clergy, but also to religious individuals. 
In one of the most strident statements, a Baptist minister recently editorialized 
that: “. . . the legalization of same-sex ‘marriage’ really is a threat to religious 
freedom. While ministers may not be required to perform such pseudo-weddings, 
there is no protection for religious individuals who prefer not to be party to such 
an absurdity. Photographers, caterers, DJs, hotels, limousine drivers, teachers, 
42 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (race); Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights 
Commission, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) 
(gender); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (gender); 
State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (religion). See generally, Laura S. Underkuffler, 
“‘Discrimination’ on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality 
in Employment,” William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 581, 589–599 (discussing the 
issue, cases, statutory claims, and defenses).
43 For example, a bitter dispute in Maine involved whether the Secretary of State—a same-
sex marriage opponent—had to include mention of a religious exemption for clergy in the 
submission of the question of same-sex marriage to a popular vote. See Susan M. Cover, 
“Public Has Its Say on Wording of Same-Sex Marriage Referendum,” Portland Press 
Herald, July 18, 2012, A1. It is a well-settled American legal principle that religious groups 
and institutions, as well as their clergy, are exempt from anti-discrimination laws when 
engaged in private religious practice. See Laura S. Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination 
and the Religious Exemption Question,” Cardozo Law Review 32 (2011): 2069, 2071–2072.
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and others will be subject to loss of employment or legal prosecution for any 
conscientious dissent or refusal to participate.” 44
The response of scholars, to date, has been cautious. Even those who are 
generally supportive of equal rights generally view the appropriate legal response 
in this context to be one of presumptive religious accommodation.45
How should we analyze these cases? To begin with, the foundational 
question—as noted above—is not new. Claims for religious exemption from 
conflicting civil-rights laws have been asserted as long as both have existed. How 
has this clash been resolved in other contexts?
In the United States, litigation for years, and at all levels, has established 
that race discrimination will not be tolerated by courts, whatever its purported 
justification. In Loving v. Virginia, the most famous case of this kind, the United 
States Supreme Court struck down a state anti-miscegenation statute that prohibited 
a “white” person from marrying any person other than another “white” person.46 
In the process, the Court stated that “this Court has consistently repudiated ‘[d]
istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to 
a free people.’”47 The statute’s religious roots had been cited by the trial court 
in its sustaining of the statute.48 These were ignored by the Supreme Court as 
apparently irrelevant.49 In Bob Jones University v. United States,50 decided sixteen 
years later, the Court explicitly addressed a religious claim and held that it could 
44 Sandy Williams, “Civil Marriage and Religious Marriage Are One and the Same,” Portland 
Press Herald, June 22, 2012, A8
45 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have 
in Common,” Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 5 (2010): 206, 207–208; 
Douglas W. Kmiec, “Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns 
Against Religion,” in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts, 
ed. Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 103, 109; Colleen 
Theresa Rutledge, “Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities of Boston Was Victim 
to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom,” Duke Journal of Gender, Law 
and Policy 15 (2008): 297, 297–300, 305-309; Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Insubstantial 
Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws,” 
Northwestern Journal of Law and Policy 5 (2010): 318.
46 See Loving, 388 U.S. (above n.42), 5 n. 4.
47 Ibid., 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 [1943]).
48 In the trial court’s words, “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, 
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his 
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.” Ibid. 3 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
49 See ibid.; Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2073.
50 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 574.
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not justify a private institution’s policy of racial discrimination.51 After Bob Jones, 
no claim of religious exceptionalism from racial-equality laws has been seriously 
entertained by any American court.
The same judicial intolerance has characterized cases dealing with 
discrimination on the basis of color or national origin. Discrimination on the 
basis of either has been declared by the Supreme Court to be “unfair, unjust, and 
inconsistent with the public policy of the United States.”52 As a result, any claim 
to engage in such discrimination has been highly suspect.  Today, there is no 
contemporary statutory or judicial authority for the idea that a claimed religious 
imperative can be used to justify discrimination of this sort.
Discrimination on the basis of gender or sex, although only more recently 
actionable, is also prohibited widely by American civil-rights laws today. The 
eradication of gender or sex discrimination in employment, housing, educational 
opportunity, and other settings has been described by the Supreme Court as a 
national priority of the highest order.53 Any claim of a right to treat men and 
women differently is subject to rigorous scrutiny, and must be proven to be 
required by a particular employment, educational, or other setting.54 The same 
refusal to “except” religious claims in the racial context is also true here.55
The last, ubiquitous civil-rights provision prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of religion. As a superficial matter, religious discrimination 
is placed into the same legal basket as is race, color, national origin, and 
gender discrimination. As stated in the Bob Jones case, discrimination 
on the basis “of . . . race, color, creed, or national origin” has long been 
condemned in American law.56  
There is, however, a potential difference in the protection (for example) of 
one’s “race” and the protection of one’s “religion.” Race (like gender, color, and 
national origin) is simply a statement of one’s status or identity: an individual 
is Asian, or black, or white. It is simply a statement of a particular personal 
characteristic. Religious discrimination, in the field of civil rights, might be 
similar. For instance, an individual might be the subject of discrimination because 
she was a Catholic, Muslim, Jew, or Jain.
51 See ibid., 604. See also Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2074.
52 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 594–595 (quoting Executive Order Number 11,063, 3 
C.F.R. 652 [1959–1963]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
54 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, §703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (setting 
forth the requirements for a gender-based bona fide occupational qualification).
55 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2079.
56 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 594–595.
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One would expect discrimination of this type to be on a par with discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, gender, and national origin, and in American law, it 
is.57 Also, as is true of the other categories, a religious basis for the discriminatory 
actor’s conduct does not change this result. Under civil-rights laws and their 
judicial interpretations, an individual’s religious beliefs (alone) cannot justify her 
refusal to employ a Muslim, serve a Jain, or to rent to a Jew. 
Religion can, however, be more than status or identity. It can also involve 
conduct, or its expression in the world. For instance, there might be a refusal to 
hire someone, or to rent to someone, who manifests particular attitudes or actions 
that are the product of his religious (protected) beliefs. These “religious conduct” 
cases are more complex. Because of the unlimited possibilities—described 
above—for religious conduct claims,58 and their completely unpredictable 
consequences for others, the legal status of these claims under civil-rights 
guarantees is far more ambiguous. Although rooted in identity, religious conduct 
that would otherwise be objectionable or actionable is not necessarily protected 
by civil-rights laws.59
Distinguishing religious “identity” cases from religious “conduct” cases might 
seem difficult at times. This is because “the kind of discrimination represented by 
the first type (‘identity discrimination’) is often bound up with certain stereotypical 
or assumed claims about the beliefs and conduct in which particular religious 
groups engage and, thus, is ‘conduct-based’ to that extent.”60 The core distinction, 
however, is clear. In discrimination of the first kind, an individual is the subject of 
discrimination solely because of his religious affiliation or religious identity; there 
is nothing objectionable about his conduct, of itself, if done by someone else.  In 
the cases of the second kind, the situation is different. It is the conduct itself that 
is objectionable; and it would be objectionable no matter what the identity of the 
person who engages in it.61
It is the religious-identity case, then, that is the classic civil-rights case. In 
such cases, does it matter if the discriminatory actor is, himself, motivated by 
religious conviction? Does it matter if an employer refuses to hire a Muslim 
because the employer is a Christian, or a landlord refuses to rent to a Jain because 
the landlord is a Jew?
Contrary to the narrative often told in elementary school textbooks, the 
United States had a long colonial history of religious-identity discrimination 
57 See Underkuffler, “‘Discrimination’ on the Basis of Religion” (above n. 42), passim.
58 See text notes 10–36 above.
59 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2077; Underkuffler, 
“‘Discrimination’” (above n. 42), passim.
60 Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2077.
61 See ibid.
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and persecution. Religious oppression and persecution was a virulent reality in 
virtually all of the American colonies, and persisted in many newly formed states 
until the nineteenth century.62 It was this historical experience that impelled the 
eventual adoption of religious equality provisions in the national constitution, state 
constitutions, and other laws. This early history, and the existence of continuing 
discriminatory practices against some religious groups, have made the eradication 
of religious discrimination in civic participation, housing, employment, and other 
aspects of public and private life a bedrock principle in the United States. Because 
of the importance of this principle, and the ease with which it could be undermined 
by religious claims, there is no support today for the claim that religious-identity 
discrimination is legally sanctioned if claimed to be “compelled” or required by 
the discriminatory actor’s religious beliefs. 
There is, thus, a fixed consensus in the United States—and, I would posit, 
in other liberal democratic countries—that identity discrimination by the 
government, as determined by race, color, national origin, gender, or religion, 
is inconsistent with fundamental liberal-democratic principles. The same is 
true of discrimination by private individuals, when they are actors in the public 
sphere. And this conviction does not change because the discriminatory conduct 
is claimed, by the discriminatory actor, to be compelled by his religious beliefs.
The prevalence of these principles raises an important question. Why is this 
so? Why is it so clear to liberal democratic societies that discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, national origin, gender, and religion is odious to the liberal 
democratic order? And, furthermore, that the religious beliefs of discriminatory 
actors do not impact this principle?  
The theoretical underpinnings for these principles are rarely articulated by 
legislatures or courts; they are assumed to be self-evident to the liberal-democratic 
reader. It is assumed by the institutions of government that a liberal-democratic 
order must grant citizenship, political power, and civic participation in all of its 
forms to all of its members on an equal basis. Subsequent conduct may, of course, 
disqualify individuals from these rights; for instance, conviction of a crime may 
mean forfeiture of freedom, or the right to vote. However, simple identity cannot be 
the basis for the denial of these rights. An individual member of the polity cannot 
be denied equal civic rights and civic participation because of her immutable, 
biological characteristics. She cannot be denied participatory rights because of the 
color of her skin, or the identity of her parents, or the sexual anatomy that she has 
(or does not have). Nor can a member of the polity be denied those participatory 
rights because of the preference—including the religious preference—of another 
62 See Underkuffler, “The Separation of the Religious and the Secular” (above n. 36), 874–
960.
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polity member. Religion, as discussed above, is an inherently subjective set of 
convictions determined by individual actors. Citizens’ convictions—no matter 
how much we might ordinarily strive to honor them—cannot be honored if their 
purpose or effect is to deny the basic political and civic participatory rights of 
others. To honor such requests would be to contradict the most fundamental 
principle of civic engagement and the governmental compact.     
Given this consensus that rejects identity discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, gender, and national origin, we reach the final question: What 
about discrimination on the basis of gay, lesbian, or transgender characteristics? 
Is this a case, like the others, of prohibited identity discrimination?
For many years in the United States, homosexual or transgender identity 
was viewed as something that was “voluntary” or “chosen” by the individual. 
In the past twenty years, there has been a massive shift in medical and public 
opinion on this issue. Today, the broader medical community has abandoned the 
position that sexual orientation is a choice, mutable at will,63 as have some of 
the most prominent spokespersons for that view.64 Changes in public opinion 
have mirrored these developments. In the 1980s, American public opinion stood 
overwhelmingly for the proposition that being gay or lesbian was a voluntary 
choice; by 2009, only 36% of respondents to a public poll believed that to be 
true.65 Understandings of transgender status or identity has undergone a similar 
evolution. The American Psychiatric Association now recognizes the deep roots 
63 See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek et. al., “Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics 
of Self-Identified Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample,” 
Sexuality Research and Social Policy 7 (2010): 7, 176–200; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 
F.Supp.2d 921, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affirmed 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (“No credible 
evidence supports a finding that an individual may, through conscious decision, therapeutic 
intervention or any other method, change his or her sexual orientation.”).
64 See, e.g., Benedict Carey, “Psychiatry Giant Sorry for Backing Gay ‘Cure,’” The New York 
Times, May 18, 2012, at A1 (discussing Dr. Robert L. Spitzer). On May 17, 2012, the Pan 
American Health Organization issued a statement which concluded that treatments that 
purport to “cure” people with non-heterosexual sexual orientation “lack medical justification 
and represent a serious threat to the health and well-being of affected people.” “[T]here 
is a professional consensus that homosexuality is a natural variation of human sexuality 
and cannot be regarded as a pathological condition.” Pan American Health Organization/
World Health Organization, “Therapies” to Change Sexual Orientation Lack Medical 
Justification and Threaten Health, http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_ conte
nt&task=view&id=6803&Itemid=1926 (accessed July 18, 2012).
65 Quinnipiac University Poll (Apr. 21–27, 2009), www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm 
(accessed July 18, 2012). For a general description of changing attitudes in the United 
States, see Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2079–2082.
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and immutability of transgender status,66 as have other medical professionals. 
Changes in public attitudes regarding transgender status is reflected in a recent 
survey of 636 major U.S. companies. Nearly one-third were found to now cover 
the cost of gender-reassignment surgery under their employee benefit plans.67 
With these shifts in attitudes have come shifts in legal understandings. In 1996, 
the United States Supreme Court described homosexual status as a biological 
“trait.”68 In a series of decisions, state supreme courts and lower federal courts 
have described sexual orientation as an “integral . . . aspect of one’s identity,”69 “a 
fundamental aspect of . . . human identity,”70 and as something that “may be altered 
[if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of 
self.”71 As noted above, protections against sexual-orientation discrimination are 
now prevalent in federal, state, and local laws.72 Regarding transgender status, early 
court decisions refused to extend civil-rights protections to transgendered persons, 
apparently due to the belief that transgendered status was a voluntary choice.73 
More recent court decisions have interpreted traditional civil-rights protections 
to include transgendered persons,74 and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission—the federal agency charged with enforcing federal laws against 
workplace discrimination—has ruled that discrimination against a transgender 
employee on the basis of the employee’s gender identity is sex discrimination 
prohibited by federal law.75 Thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and many 
local governments explicitly include gender identity as a protected characteristic 
in civil rights and hate-crimes legislation.76
66 See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (4th ed. 2000), 576–582 (transgender status describes a disjunction between an 
individual’s sexual anatomy and sexual identity).
67 See http://ideas.time.com/2011/12/12/transgender-the-next-frontier-in-human-rights (accessed 
July 18, 2012). 
68 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
69 In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385, 442 (Cal. 2008).
70 Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
71 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
72 See text at notes 39–41 above.
73 See Sunish Gulati, “The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping 
Jurisprudence,” New York University Law Review 78 (2003): 2177, 2187.
74 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 
401 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). For an extended discussion of recent cases see Glenn, 633 
F.3d at 1318 n. 5.
75 See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, Agency No. ATF-2011-00751 (April 
20, 2012).
76 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2089–2090.
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New public understandings of sexual orientation and transgender status have 
left little life in old arguments that these identities are not immutable, personal 
characteristics in the way that race, color, parentage, and gender are. The argument 
that attractions to persons of the same sex, or repudiation of the biological gender 
with which one has been identified, are simply “choices” or “actions” within the 
control of the individual is no longer made by responsible members of the medical 
profession or by sophisticated legal commentators.77 Furthermore, because sexual 
orientation and transgender status are immutable, personal characteristics—like 
race, color, parentage, and gender—there is no apparent basis for a difference 
in their legal treatment. Gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals with these 
characteristics should be presumptively entitled (like other protected groups) to 
citizenship, political power, and civic participation in all of its forms, on an equal 
basis with others.
What remains, of course, is the religious-exceptionalism question. Perhaps 
sexual orientation and transgender status are protected, “identity” characteristics 
of individuals; however, that fact alone does not answer the next question: should 
religious individuals be required—by law—to serve, hire, house, or otherwise 
publically engage with them on an equal basis, when the religions of those 
individuals dictate otherwise?
As discussed above, religious exceptionalism claimed by individuals to 
justify discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, and 
religious identity in public transactions and civic affairs is a discredited notion, 
and presumptively invalid under American law. For religious exceptionalism 
to survive in the sexual-orientation/transgender context, human-rights claims 
on those grounds would have to be distinguished from those made on the other 
grounds.  
The usual argument for religious exceptionalism in this context is made 
along the following lines: There is generally no argument that gay, lesbian, 
and transgender status is itself different from the racial, parentage, religious, 
or gender-related status that forms the basis for other, ubiquitously prohibited 
forms of identity discrimination. Most advocates of religious exceptionalism 
wholeheartedly agree that gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals may exist, 
unmolested and presumptively equal to other citizens. That, they argue, is not 
when religious exceptionalism is required or justified. Rather, it is required and 
77 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 984 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (discussing courts’ rejection of “the mistaken assumption that sexual orientation 
is merely ‘behavioral,’ rather than the sort of deeply rooted, immutable characteristic that 
warrants heightened protection from discrimination”).
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justified when the issue is conduct by those individuals—and religious individuals 
are required, by civil-rights laws, to participate in or ratify that conduct.
This argument is vividly illustrated by the same-sex marriage issue. In the 
view of the Baptist pastor quoted above, it is not the simple status of gay or lesbian 
individuals that is at issue; it is the conduct of those individuals. It is when gay 
and lesbian individuals engage in “pseudo-marriages” that the religious exemption 
question arises, and when religious individuals should not be forced to deal with 
them.78 The portrayal of the situation is one of action. There must be “protection 
for religious individuals who prefer not to be a party to . . . [the] absurdity of 
gay marriage.” Photographers, caterers, hotel owners, teachers, and others should 
not “be subject to loss of employment or legal prosecution for any . . . refusal to 
participate.”79             
This argument is an interesting sleight of hand. Describing the action 
required of religious objectors subliminally suggests that gay or lesbian civil 
rights claimants are engaging (fundamentally) in action as well. Does the fact 
that the gay, lesbian, or transgender individual engages in action when renting an 
apartment, seeking employment, getting married, hiring a caterer, and renting a 
hotel room destroy this transaction as a (protected) identity claim?
This argument echoes, faintly, the identity/action distinction in religious civil-
rights claims discussed above.80 As the reader will recall, claimed discrimination 
on the basis of religion can be of two kinds: discrimination on the basis of 
identity—that is, an individual is not hired or afforded an apartment because she is 
a Christian; and discrimination on the basis of conduct—an example being that an 
individual desires to engage in otherwise objectionable conduct, such as absence 
from work, for religious reasons but is denied the opportunity to do so. As pointed 
out above, American law is extraordinarily protective of the claimant in the first 
case, but less so in the second. Is this same template—protection for identity, but 
not for conduct—applicable to the same-sex marriage case? 
In fact, the conduct that is involved in these two contexts is of entirely different 
kinds. The conduct in the religious discrimination “conduct” case is objectionable, 
independent of the identity of the actor; the actor wishes to do something that work 
rules, conventions, or laws otherwise forbid. The conduct in the same-sex marriage 
case, on the other hand, is not objectionable in itself—or objectionable at all. It 
is a permitted—indeed, in the United States, a constitutionally protected—right, 
for others. It is only because of the identity of the gay or lesbian actor that the 
objection arises. It is, thus, not a “conduct” case at all, but one of “identity” alone. 
78 Williams, “Civil Marriage” (above n. 44).
79 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
80 See text at notes 57–61 above.
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Indeed, upon further reflection, the religious objector’s “conduct” argument 
must completely, and necessarily, collapse. All identity claims must involve 
conduct or action by the civil-rights claimant if they are to be legally cognizable. 
If an individual simply exists as black, Asian, Jewish, female, or gay, there is no 
discriminatory action and no legal case. It is when that individual attempts to 
act, and is denied, services or goods in the world—renting an apartment, buying 
a house, obtaining a job, procuring a marriage license, hiring a caterer, and the 
myriad of other activities that are a part of civic life—that there is any ground for 
legal complaint or action.    There is, therefore, no doubt that same-sex 
marriage cases, and other gay, lesbian, and transgender cases, involve identity 
claims. There is no reason to subordinate them to the claims of religious objectors 
on this basis. Is there any other?
There is a remaining objection that is often advanced. This objection accepts 
the fact that gay, lesbian, and transgender status involves identity, and that 
identity claims involve the equal right of individuals to act (in ways acted by 
others) in the world. Rather, the objection is this. Although the identity claim 
is real, and substantial, the burden on the religious objector—when required to 
honor that claim—is also real and substantial. In a shootout between these claims, 
on their theoretical merits, the religious claim might lose, as it concededly does 
when it opposes civil-rights claims on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, and gender. However, the religious objector does not demand the ability 
to engage in discrimination in its harshest forms; he demands only situational 
accommodation. If the religious objector’s needs can be met without much harm 
to the gay, lesbian, or transgender individual—indeed perhaps, in some cases, 
without the discriminatee’s knowledge—then that accommodation should be 
made. For instance, the religious objection should be honored if the gay, lesbian, or 
transgender individual can obtain similar commercial services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges elsewhere.81 Thus a city clerk should be 
able to silently step aside, when asked to issue a same-sex marriage license, if she 
knows that her colleague is available to perform the municipal function.82
The idea that religious accommodations could be made so that both sides win 
is a very attractive suggestion. Religious freedom is highly valued in American 
life, and no one wants to force a sincere religious adherent to do unnecessary 
things that are abhorrent to her conscience.  If accommodation can be made 
81 See Marc D. Stern, “Liberty v. Equality: Equality v. Liberty,” Northwestern Journal of 
Law and Social Policy 5 (2010): 307.
82 See, e.g., Berg, “Same-Sex Marriage” (above n. 45), 228–232; Wilson, “Insubstantial 
Burdens” (above n. 45), 323–326.
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with little practical inconvenience to (or even awareness of) the gay, lesbian, or 
transgender person, what is the harm in it?  
The harm that accomodationists consider to be at issue, and to be minimal, 
is “material” or “transactional” harm: harm to an individual because he or she 
cannot get served, rent the apartment, obtain the marriage license, and so on. If 
an alternative exists, such harms are (arguably) avoided, or of minimal effect 
(although having to drive down the road to another hotel after a tiring day’s 
journey is not a de minimus annoyance). Focus on such harms, however, misses 
the point. We do not ban discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, 
religion, gender, and other grounds because, if we did not, the victim would have 
no housing to buy or restaurant to patronize; we ban it because the denial of pubic 
goods, facilities, services, and accommodations is itself the evil to be addressed. 
There is more than the conveyance of a private “message of disapproval”83 that 
the victim should ignore; it is—if tolerated by the greater polity—a statement 
that the victim has no valid claim to the equal treatment that the law otherwise 
demands. In cases involving race, color, national origin, religion, and gender, the 
polity has decreed that identity discrimination is not trivial, and that the interest 
in its eradication is not something whose victims are expected to ignore, or whose 
sting can be alleviated by accommodations by others. We would never expect a 
mixed-race couple to graciously tolerate a discriminatory town clerk, or a Catholic 
to graciously tolerate a discriminatory landlord, or a woman to graciously tolerate 
a discriminatory employer, because available alternatives exist. The issue is not 
only individual transactional difficulties, but societal condemnation. If sexual 
orientation and transgender status are identity-based claims of a similar nature, 
there is no reason to believe that unequal treatment—including religiously 
motivated unequal treatment—is any less violative of the social compact.       
4. Conclusion
The liberal-democratic governmental compact assures that citizenship, political 
power, and civic participation in all of its forms will be afforded to all citizens on 
an equal basis. In particular, simple identity—as a presumptive matter—cannot be 
the basis for the denial of human rights. It is on this simple yet elegant principle 
that all civil-rights laws are founded.
Freedom of religion presents a particularly complex problem in this context. 
On the one hand, it is—itself—a universally recognized member of the human 
rights family, and is protected under civil-rights laws. On the other hand, it is—
because of its possible invocation by any person, its self-definition by adherents, 
83 See Berg, “Same-Sex Marriage” (above n.45), 229.
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and its unreviewability by courts—a potentially anarchic and undermining force 
of all laws, including those that protect the civil (human) rights of others.
When the claimed religious freedom of one citizen conflicts with the claimed 
civil rights of other citizens, a choice by the polity must be made. It is not a 
question of “painless” accommodation, or the existence of alternatives for the 
civil-rights claimant; it is a question of whether the polity, as a whole, will vindicate 
the principle of identity equality. We have already recognized and enforced the 
principle that all citizens are entitled to political power and civic participation 
on an equal basis without regard to their racial, religious, parentage, or gender 
identities. It is time to include sexual orientation and transgender status as well.
